The Implications of the Second-Person Perspective for Personhood: An Application to the case of Human Infants and Non-human Primates

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):133-150 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper proposes an intermediate account of personhood, based on the capacity to participate in intersubjective interactions. We articulate our proposal as a reply to liberal and restrictive accounts, taking Mark Rowlands’ and Stephen Darwall’s proposals as contemporary representatives of each view, respectively. We argue that both accounts fall short of dealing with borderline cases and defend our intermediate view: The criteria of personhood based on the second-person perspective of mental state attribution. According to it, a person should be able to participate in intersubjective interactions. We apply our proposal to the borderline cases of non-human primates and human infants.

Author Profiles

Pamela Barone
Universitat de les Illes Balears
Carme Isern-Mas
Universitat de les Illes Balears


Added to PP

181 (#74,426)

6 months
79 (#57,672)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?