The role of experience in demonstrative thought

Mind and Language 34 (5):648-666 (2019)
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Abstract

Attention plays a role in demonstrative thought: It sets the targets. Visual experience also plays a role. I argue here that it makes visual information available for use in the voluntary control of focal attention. To do so I use both introspection and neurophysiological evidence from projections between areas of attentional control and neural correlates of consciousness. Campbell and Smithies also identify roles for experience, but they further argue that only experience can play those roles. In contrast, I argue that experience is not the only way in which visual information could be accessed for the voluntary control of attention.

Author's Profile

Michael Barkasi
Washington University in St. Louis

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