Truth without standard models: some conceptual problems reloaded

Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (1):122-139 (2018)
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Abstract

A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT.

Author Profiles

Bruno Da Re
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
Eduardo Alejandro Barrio
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)

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