Truth without standard models: some conceptual problems reloaded

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Abstract
A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT.
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2017, 2018
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BARTWS-6
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Archival date: 2018-03-12
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References found in this work BETA
Reaching Transparent Truth.Cobreros, Pablo; Égré, Paul; Ripley, David & van Rooij, Robert
Proof and Truth.Shapiro, Stewart

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2017-11-21

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