Valence: A reflection

Emotion Researcher: ISRE's Sourcebook for Research on Emotion and Affect (forthcoming)
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Abstract
This article gives a short presentation of reflexive imperativism, the intentionalist theory of valence I developed with Max Khan Hayward. The theory says that mental states have valence in virtue of having reflexive imperative content. More precisely, mental states have positive valence (i.e., feel good) in virtue of issuing the command "More of me!", and they have negative valence (i.e., feel bad) in virtue of issuing the command "Less of me!" The article summarises the main arguments in favour of reflexive imperativism and against other intentionalist treatments of valence.
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Archival date: 2020-10-15
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2020-10-15

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