Dissertation, Kings College London (
2008)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
Wright's _Truth and Objectivity_ seeks to systematise a variety of
anti-realist positions. I argue that many objections to the system
are avoided by transposing its talk of truth into talk of warrant.
However, a problem remains about debates involving 'direction-of-fit'.
Dummett introduced 'anti-realism' as a philosophical view informed by
mathematical intuitionism. Subsequently, the term has been associated
with many debates, ancient and modern. _Truth and Objectivity_
proposes that truth admits of different characteristics; these various
debates then concern which characteristics truth has, in a given area.
This pluralism of truth is at odds with deflationism. I find fault
with Wright's argument against deflationism. However, transmission of
warrant across the Disquotational Schema suffices to ground Wright's
proposal, which survives as a pluralism of classes of warrant.
The two main debates concern whether truths are always knowable
(Epistemic Constraint) and whether disagreements in an area must be
down to some fault of one of those involved (Cognitive Command). I
introduce Assertoric Constraint, relating to Epistemic Constraint,
where truths cannot outstrip the availability of warrant for their
assertion. I solve a structural problem by a comparison with a
constitutive analysis of Moore's Paradox. The relativism of blameless
disagreement is problematic. Wright's response invokes a sort of
ignorance which he calls `Quandary'. I criticise this before
proposing an alternative.
I agree with Wright that Dummett's original anti-realism does not
belong among the positions which Wright seeks to systematise.
However, two candidates show that the proposal suffers a weakness.
Wright thinks Expressivism misguided, and implicitly rules out his
earlier non-cognitivism about necessity. I argue that Expressivism
has promise, and I endorse Wright's Cautious Man argument for
non-cognitivism about necessity; both involve play with
`direction-of-fit'. I conclude that this sort of anti-realist debate
needs to be accommodated by the proposal.