Whither internalism? How internalists should respond to the extended mind hypothesis

Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184 (2008)
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Abstract
A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the internalist thesis—albeit one that most internalists have adhered to. I show that internalism is entirely compatible with the EMH. This view should prompt us to reconsider the characterization of internalism, and in conclusion I make some brief remarks about how that project might proceed.
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Archival date: 2015-08-26
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References found in this work BETA
Brainstorms.Dennett, Daniel C.
Cognition in the Wild.Hutchins, Edwin
The Extended Mind.Clark, Andy & Chalmers, David J.

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2009-01-28

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