A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging

In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that morality might bear on belief in at least two conceptually distinct ways. The first is that morality might bear on belief by bearing on questions of justification. The claim that it does is the doctrine of moral encroachment. The second, is that morality might bear on belief given the central role belief plays in mediating and thereby constituting our relationships with one another. The claim that it does is the doctrine of doxastic wronging. Though conceptually distinct, the two doctrines overlap in important ways. This paper provides clarification on the relationship between the two, providing reasons throughout that we should accept both.
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First archival date: 2020-07-20
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