Considering the roles of values in practical reasoning argumentation evaluation

Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA) (2013)
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Abstract
Building upon the role values take in Walton’s theory of practical reasoning, this paper will frame the question of how values should be evaluated into the broader question of what reasonable practical argumentation is. The thesis argued for is that if a positive evaluation of practical reasoning argumentation requires that the argument avoid a morally negative conclusion, then the role of values should be given a central, rather than supportive, position in practical argument evaluation
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Archival date: 2015-09-02
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