Epistemic Contrastivism

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Contrastivism about knowledge is the view that one does not just know some proposition. It is more adequate to say that one knows something rather than something else: I know that I am looking at a tree rather than a bush but I do not know that I am looking at a tree rather than a cleverly done tree imitation. Knowledge is a three-place relation between a subject, a proposition and a contrast set of propositions. There are several advantages of a contrastivist view but also certain problems with it.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BAUEC-3
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-08-23
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Operators.Dretske, Fred I.
Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Schaffer, Jonathan & Knobe, Joshua
Knowing the Answer.Schaffer, Jonathan
Moral Skepticism and Justification.Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-08-23

Total views
214 ( #20,478 of 50,290 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
69 ( #7,783 of 50,290 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.