Epistemic Contrastivism, Knowledge and Practical Reasoning

Erkenntnis 81 (1):59-68 (2016)
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Abstract
Epistemic contrastivism is the view that knowledge is a ternary relation between a person, a proposition and a set of contrast propositions. This view is in tension with widely shared accounts of practical reasoning: be it the claim that knowledge of the premises is necessary for acceptable practical reasoning based on them or sufficient for the acceptability of the use of the premises in practical reasoning, or be it the claim that there is a looser connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. Given plausible assumptions, epistemic contrastivism implies that we should cut all links between knowledge and practical reasoning. However, the denial of any such link requires additional and independent arguments; if such arguments are lacking, then all the worse for epistemic contrastivism
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Archival date: 2016-01-23
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Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew

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