Vagueness Intuitions and the Mobility of Cognitive Sortals

Minds and Machines 22 (3):213-234 (2012)
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One feature of vague predicates is that, as far as appearances go, they lack sharp application boundaries. I argue that we would not be able to locate boundaries even if vague predicates had sharp boundaries. I do so by developing an idealized cognitive model of a categorization faculty which has mobile and dynamic sortals (`classes', `concepts' or `categories') and formally prove that the degree of precision with which boundaries of such sortals can be located is inversely constrained by their flexibility. Given the literature, it is plausible that we are appropriately like the model. Hence, an inability to locate sharp boundaries is not necessarily because there are none; boundaries could be sharp and it is plausible that we would nevertheless be unable to locate them.
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.Williamson, Timothy
Vagueness.Williamson, Timothy
The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp.Swain, Stacey; Alexander, Joshua & Weinberg, Jonathan M.

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