Berkeley, perception, and identity

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):85-98 (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Berkeley says both that one sometimes immediately perceives the same thing by sight and touch, and that one never does. To solve the contradiction I recommend and explain a distinction Berkeley himself makes—between two uses of ‘same’. This solution unifies two seemingly inconsistent parts of Berkeley’s whole project: He argues both that what we see are bits of light and color organized into a language by which God speaks to us about tactile sensations, and yet that we directly see ordinary objects. My solution explains how these can come to the same thing.

Author's Profile

Donald L. M. Baxter
University of Connecticut


Added to PP

256 (#48,327)

6 months
102 (#21,058)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?