Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ’No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ’Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can directly inform the phenomenal character of perception.

Author's Profile

Tim Bayne
Monash University

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,486 (#5,981)

6 months
177 (#12,443)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?