A priori knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa

Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):163-174 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper contains replies to comments on the author's paper "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy." Several points in the argument of that paper are given further clarification: the notion of our standard justificatory procedure, the notion of a basic source of evidence, and the doctrine of modal reliabilism. The reliability of intuition is then defended against Lycan's skepticism and a response is given to Lycan's claim that the scope of a priori knowledge does not include philosophically central topics such as the nature of consciousness. Next a counterfactual account of intuitions proposed by Sosa is criticized. Finally, in response to certain questions raised by Sosa, the explanation of the evidential status of intuition offered in the original paper receives further elaboration.

Author's Profile

George Bealer
Yale University

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
898 (#15,452)

6 months
99 (#45,233)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?