Mind and anti-mind: Why thinking has no functional definition

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):283-328 (1984)
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Abstract
Functionalism would be mistaken if there existed a system of deviant relations (an “anti-mind”) that had the same functional roles as the standard mental relations. In this paper such a system is constructed, using “Quinean transformations” of the sort associated with Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. For example, a mapping m from particularistic propositions (e.g., that there exists a rabbit) to universalistic propositions (that rabbithood is manifested). Using m, a deviant relation thinking* is defined: x thinks* p iff x thinks m(p). Such deviant relations satisfy the commonly discussed functionalist psychological principles. Finally, a more complicated system of deviant relations is constructed, one satisfying sophisticated principles dealing with the self-conscious rational mind.
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1985
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First archival date: 2015-12-18
Latest version: 2 (2016-06-18)
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Ontogeny and Intentionality.Zelazo, Philip David & Reznick, J. Steven

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