Mental properties

Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208 (1994)
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Abstract
It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity thesis, but also the metaphysical possibility of disembodiment.
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BEAMP
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Archival date: 2015-12-19
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