Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy

In Michael Raymond DePaul & William M. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 201-240 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The phenomenology of a priori intuition is explored at length (where a priori intuition is taken to be not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory seeming). Various reductive accounts of intuition are criticized, and Humean empiricism (which, unlike radical empiricism, does admit analyticity intuitions as evidence) is shown to be epistemically self-defeating. This paper also recapitulates the defense of the thesis of the Autonomy and Authority of Philosophy given in the author’s “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy” (Philosophical Studies, 1996).

Author's Profile

George Bealer
Yale University

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-05-09

Downloads
967 (#14,354)

6 months
13,721 (#11)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?