The philosophical limits of scientific essentialism

Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365 (1987)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Scientific essentialism is the view that some necessities can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scientific essentialism does not extend to the central questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scientific essentialism is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its central questions is also reliable. Included is an outline of a modal reliabilist theory of basic evidence and a concept-possession account of the reliability of a priori intuition.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BEATPL
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-12-09
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,112 ( #2,657 of 51,448 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
66 ( #7,766 of 51,448 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.