The philosophical limits of scientific essentialism

Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365 (1987)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Scientific essentialism is the view that some necessities can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scientific essentialism does not extend to the central questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scientific essentialism is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its central questions is also reliable. Included is an outline of a modal reliabilist theory of basic evidence and a concept-possession account of the reliability of a priori intuition.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BEATPL
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-12-09
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 49 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
982 ( #2,015 of 41,462 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
59 ( #9,798 of 41,462 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.