The self-consciousness argument : Functionalism and the corruption of intentional content

In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this chapter I argue that there is such a barrier created by self-conscious intentional states—conscious intentional states that are about one’s own conscious intentional states. As we will see, however, this result is entirely compatible with a scientific theory of mind, and, in fact, there is an elegant non-reductive framework in which just such a theory may be pursued.

Author's Profile

George Bealer
Yale University


Added to PP

385 (#44,524)

6 months
74 (#61,834)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?