The self-consciousness argument : Functionalism and the corruption of intentional content

In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this chapter I argue that there is such a barrier created by self-conscious intentional states—conscious intentional states that are about one’s own conscious intentional states. As we will see, however, this result is entirely compatible with a scientific theory of mind, and, in fact, there is an elegant non-reductive framework in which just such a theory may be pursued.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BEATSA-5
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-12-07
Latest version: 2 (2015-12-07)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-09-15

Total views
147 ( #20,129 of 41,608 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #28,439 of 41,608 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.