Lewis, Loar and the Logical Form of Attitude Ascriptions

South African Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):100-104 (1988)
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Abstract

In this article, the attempts by David Lewis and Brian Loar to make perspicuous the logical form of sentences ascribing propositional attitudes to individuals are set out and criticized. Both work within the assumption of the truth of 'type' physicalism, and require that logically perspicuous attitude ascriptions be compatible with the demands of such a doctrine. It is argued that neither carry out this task successfully - Lewis's perspicuous ascriptions have counter-intuitive implications, while Loar's avoidance of these undermines type physicalism itself.

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Simon Beck
University of the Western Cape

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