Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions

Erkenntnis 87 (3):1175-1190 (2022)
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Abstract

Unconscious perceptions have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin’s to develop a new version of naive realism—neuro-computational naive realism. I argue that neuro-computational naive realism offers a uniform treatment of both conscious and unconscious perceptions. I also argue that it accommodates the possibility of phenomenally different conscious perceptions of the same items, and that it can answer a further challenge to naive realism raised by Berger and Nanay.

Author's Profile

Ori Beck
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

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