The Extreme Claim, Psychological Continuity and the Person Life View

South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):314-322 (2015)
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Abstract
Marya Schechtman has raised a series of worries for the Psychological Continuity Theory of personal identity (PCT) stemming out of what Derek Parfit called the ‘Extreme Claim’. This is roughly the claim that theories like it are unable to explain the importance we attach to personal identity. In her recent Staying Alive (2014), she presents further arguments related to this and sets out a new narrative theory, the Person Life View (PLV), which she sees as solving the problems as well as bringing other advantages over the PCT. I look over some of her earlier arguments and responses to them as a way in to the new issues and theory. I argue that the problems for the PCT and advantages that the PLV brings are all merely apparent, and present no reason for giving up the former for the latter.
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2017
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Archival date: 2015-10-09
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The Constitution of Selves.Williams, Christopher & Schechtman, Marya

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