Transplant Thought-Experiments: Two costly mistakes in discounting them

South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):189-199 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX


‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another, have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to make. I argue that the case against them rests on two serious misunderstandings of the operation of thought-experiments, and that even if they do not ultimately support a psychological continuity theory, they do major damage to that theory’s opponents.

Author's Profile

Simon Beck
University of the Western Cape


Added to PP

1,357 (#4,908)

6 months
197 (#4,660)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?