Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention

Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):346-378 (2022)
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This paper develops a question-sensitive theory of intention. We show that this theory explains some puzzling closure properties of intention. In particular, it can be used to explain why one is rationally required to intend the means to one’s ends, even though one is not rationally required to intend all the foreseen consequences of one’s intended actions. It also explains why rational intention is not always closed under logical implication, and why one can only intend outcomes that one believes to be under one’s control.

Author Profiles

Bob Beddor
National University of Singapore
Simon Goldstein
Australian Catholic University


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