Believing epistemic contradictions

Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114 (2018)
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Abstract
What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.
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2018
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BEDBEC
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Archival date: 2018-01-15
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References found in this work BETA
.Williamson, Timothy
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David K.
Epistemic Modals.Yalcin, Seth
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Citations of this work BETA
Bounded Modality.Mandelkern, Matthew
Modality and Expressibility.Mandelkern, Matthew
What It Takes to Believe.Rothschild, Daniel

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2017-09-13

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