Believing epistemic contradictions

Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114 (2018)
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Abstract

What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.

Author Profiles

Simon Goldstein
University of Hong Kong
Bob Beddor
University of Florida

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