Practical Knowledge Without Luminosity

Mind:fzab041 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
According to a rich tradition in philosophy of action, intentional action requires practical knowledge: someone who acts intentionally knows what they are doing while they are doing it. PiƱeros Glasscock (2020) argues that an anti-luminosity argument, of the sort developed in Williamson (2000), can be readily adapted to provide a reductio of an epistemic condition on intentional action. This paper undertakes a rescue mission on behalf of an epistemic condition on intentional action. We formulate and defend a version of an epistemic condition that is free from any luminosity commitments. While this version of an epistemic condition escapes reductio, it comes with substantive commitments of its own. In particular, we will see that it forces us to deny the existence of any essentially intentional actions. We go on to argue that this consequence should be embraced. On the resulting picture, intentional action is not luminous. But it still entails practical knowledge.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-06-14
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
165 ( #36,449 of 65,558 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
93 ( #7,146 of 65,558 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.