Shifty evidence and shifty books

Analysis 81 (2):193-198 (2021)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Are all epistemic notions – including evidence and rational credence – sensitive to practical considerations? A number of philosophers have argued that the answer must be ‘No’, since otherwise rational agents would be susceptible to diachronic Dutch books. After unpacking this challenge, I show how it can be resisted by appealing to an analogy between shifting stakes and memory loss. The upshot: pervasive epistemic shiftiness may be tenable after all.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BEDSEA
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-09-23
Latest version: 2 (2020-09-24)
View other versions
Added to PP
2020-09-23

Downloads
214 (#35,495)

6 months
32 (#26,777)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?