How Different Kinds of Disagreement Impact Folk Metaethical Judgments

In Jennifer Cole Wright & Hagop Sarkissian (eds.), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 167-187 (2014)
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Abstract
Th e present article reports a series of experiments designed to extend the empirical investigation of folk metaethical intuitions by examining how different kinds of ethical disagreement can impact attributions of objectivity to ethical claims.
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Archival date: 2016-11-28
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References found in this work BETA
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David K.
Folk Moral Relativism.Sarkissian, Hagop; Park, John; Tien, David; Wright, Jennifer & Knobe, Joshua
The Psychology of Meta-Ethics: Exploring Objectivism.Goodwin, Geoffrey P. & Darley, John M.

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“Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective”.Beebe, James; Qiaoan, Runya; Wysocki, Tomasz & Endara, Miguel A.

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