The Participant Attitude and the Moral Psychology of Responsibility

Midwest Studies in Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued that our responsibility practices reflect a distinctive and natural way we’re oriented toward other people: the participant attitude. This idea has been influential. However, it is also widely acknowledged that Strawson’s account of the participant attitude is at best incomplete. In this paper, I argue that the lacuna in Strawson’s thought corresponds to a lacuna in the wider literature on the moral psychology of responsibility. This lacuna, I hold, limits our understanding of both our responsibility practices and what it means to be responsible. I then develop a more determinate account of the participant attitude, one that, I argue, promises to fill this lacuna and provide a unifying and illuminating framework for thinking about the moral psychology of responsibility.

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David Beglin
University of California, Riverside (PhD)

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