Doxastic Affirmative Action

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (2):203-220 (2024)
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According to the relational egalitarian theory of justice, justice requires that people relate as equals. To relate as equals, many relational egalitarians argue, people must (i) regard each other as equals, and (ii) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that, under conditions of background injustice, such relational egalitarians should endorse affirmative action in the ways in which (dis)esteem is attributed to people as part of the regard-requirement for relating as equals.

Author Profiles

Andreas Bengtson
Aarhus University
Lauritz Munch
Aarhus University


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