Demoralising Trust

Ethics (forthcoming)
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What do we expect of those whom we trust? Some argue that when we trust we are confident the trusted will act on moral motivations. But often we trust without appraising the trusted’s moral qualities, and sometimes trust expects more than morality demands. I argue for a non-moral commitments account: when we trust a person we expect they will be motivated to act a certain way by a commitment that we ascribe to them. My alternative accommodates an expanded typology of trust’s vulnerabilities, including tragic disappointments that are as painful as betrayal, but without the recompense of moral complaint.
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Archival date: 2020-10-15
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