Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had

Episteme 13 (4):471-479 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Epistemologists focus primarily on cases of knowledge, belief, or credence where the evidence which one possesses, or on which one is relying, plays a fundamental role in the epistemic or normative status of one's doxastic state. Recent work in epistemology goes beyond the evidence one possesses to consider the relevance for such statuses of evidence which one does not possess, particularly when there is a sense in which one should have had some evidence. I focus here on Sanford Goldberg's approach ("Should Have Known," Synthese, forthcoming; and "On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had," Episteme 2016, this issue); but the discussion will interest anyone working on epistemic defeat.
Reprint years
2016
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BENKAE
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-07-07
Latest version: 4 (2020-04-26)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2015-07-07

Total views
760 ( #6,154 of 2,426,000 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
113 ( #5,360 of 2,426,000 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.