Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships

Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-32 (forthcoming)
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Many believe that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relationships. In this paper, we argue that this view cannot be justified by appeal to (i) beneficence, (ii) shared projects, (iii) vulnerability, (iv) epistemic access, (v) expressivism, or (vi) autonomy as nonalienation. We finally provide an error theory for why many may have believed that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relations.

Author Profiles

Andreas Bengtson
Aarhus University
Soren Flinch Midtgaard
Aarhus University


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