Properly Proleptic Blame

Ethics 127 (4):852-882 (2017)
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Abstract
Crucially, blame can be addressed to its targets, as an implicit demand for recognition. But when we ask whether offenders would actually appreciate this demand, via a sound deliberative route from their existing motivations, we face a puzzle. If they would, their offense reflects a deliberative mistake, and blame’s hostility seems unnecessary. If they wouldn’t, addressing them is futile, and blame’s emotional engagement seems unwarranted. To resolve this puzzle, I develop an account of blame as a proleptic response to indeterminacy in its target’s reasons, yielding attractive accounts of blame’s relation both to internal reasons claims and to free will.
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2017
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First archival date: 2017-02-14
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