Properly Proleptic Blame

Ethics 127 (4):852-882 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Crucially, blame can be addressed to its targets, as an implicit demand for recognition. But when we ask whether offenders would actually appreciate this demand, via a sound deliberative route from their existing motivations, we face a puzzle. If they would, their offense reflects a deliberative mistake, and blame’s hostility seems unnecessary. If they wouldn’t, addressing them is futile, and blame’s emotional engagement seems unwarranted. To resolve this puzzle, I develop an account of blame as a proleptic response to indeterminacy in its target’s reasons, yielding attractive accounts of blame’s relation both to internal reasons claims and to free will.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Reprint years
2017
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BENPPB-4
Revision history
First archival date: 2017-02-14
Latest version: 6 (2017-06-27)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-02-14

Total views
325 ( #9,725 of 41,624 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #11,051 of 41,624 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.