Qualia Qua Qualitons: Mental Qualities as Abstract Particulars

Acta Analytica 26 (2):155-163 (2011)
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In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition for learning. We argue that qualia taken to be qualitons are part of our mechanism of sensory concept acquisition

Author Profiles

Eros Carvalho
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
Hilan Bensusan
University of Brasilia


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