Vagueness : a statistical epistemicist approach

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
There are three main traditional accounts of vagueness : one takes it as a genuinely metaphysical phenomenon, one takes it as a phenomenon of ignorance, and one takes it as a linguistic or conceptual phenomenon. In this paper I first very briefly present these views, especially the epistemicist and supervaluationist strategies, and shortly point to some well-known problems that the views carry. I then examine a 'statistical epistemicist' account of vagueness that is designed to avoid precisely these problems – it will be a view that provides an account of the phenomenon of vagueness as coming from our linguistic practices, while insisting that meaning supervenes on use, and that our use of vague terms does yield sharp and precise meanings, which we ignore, thus allowing bivalence to hold.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-08-01
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Borel on the Heap.Égré, Paul & Barberousse, Anouk
Nothing is Alive.Benovsky, Jiri

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
222 ( #12,642 of 38,962 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #24,754 of 38,962 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.