Accuracy and Credal Imprecision

Noûs (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some new results, which show that there is little hope for reconciling the rationality of credal imprecision with accuracy-centered epistemology.
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Archival date: 2018-12-06
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Bayesian Epistemology.Bovens, Luc & Hartmann, Stephan

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