An Emergentist Argument for the Impossibility of Zombie Duplicates

Working Papers Series - FMSH (2016)
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Abstract
Some influential arguments in the metaphysics of consciousness, in particular Chalmers’ Zombie Argument, suppose that all the physical properties of composed physical systems are metaphysically necessitated by their fundamental constituents. In this paper I argue against this thesis in order to debate Chalmers’ argument. By discussing, in non-technical terms, an EPR system I try to show that there are good reasons to hold that some composed physical systems have properties which are nomologically necessitated by their fundamental constituents, i.e., which emerge in the sense of the so-called ‘nomological supervenience’ views.
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Archival date: 2017-08-23
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