An Emergentist Argument for the Impossibility of Zombie Duplicates

Working Papers Series - FMSH (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Some influential arguments in the metaphysics of consciousness, in particular Chalmers’ Zombie Argument, suppose that all the physical properties of composed physical systems are metaphysically necessitated by their fundamental constituents. In this paper I argue against this thesis in order to debate Chalmers’ argument. By discussing, in non-technical terms, an EPR system I try to show that there are good reasons to hold that some composed physical systems have properties which are nomologically necessitated by their fundamental constituents, i.e., which emerge in the sense of the so-called ‘nomological supervenience’ views.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BERAEA-10
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-08-23
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-08-23

Total views
75 ( #40,199 of 53,695 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #50,091 of 53,695 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.