Coherentism via Graphs

Philosophical Issues 25 (1):322-352 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is too vague or metaphorical for serious theoretical use. The key to my approach is to take a familiar tool from discussions of the regress problem -- namely, directed graphs depicting the support relations between beliefs -- and to use that tool in a more sophisticated manner than it is standardly employed.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BERCVG
Revision history
First archival date: 2014-09-09
Latest version: 3 (2015-08-06)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
On What Grounds What.Schaffer, Jonathan

View all 45 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-09-09

Total views
548 ( #7,175 of 49,995 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #13,628 of 49,995 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.