Default Hypotheses in the Study of Perception: A Reply to Phillips

Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):206-219 (2021)
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Some theorists have recently raised doubts about much of the experimental evidence purporting to demonstrate the existence of unconscious perception. In our (2019) in this journal, we argued some of these considerations are not decisive. Phillips (forthcoming a) replies thoughtfully to our paper, concluding that he is unconvinced by our arguments. Phillips maintains that the view that perception is invariably conscious remains, as he puts it, the “default” hypothesis both within the folk understanding and experimental study of perception. There is much to agree with in Phillips’ piece, but there remain some substantive points of disagreement, which we outline here.
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