How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists

Dialogue 56 (3):503-526 (2017)
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Abstract
According to David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power of HOT theory.
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Archival date: 2020-09-20
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2017-07-26

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