Impossible Worlds and the Logic of Imagination

Erkenntnis 82 (6):1277-1297 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I want to model a finite, fallible cognitive agent who imagines that p in the sense of mentally representing a scenario—a configuration of objects and properties—correctly described by p. I propose to capture imagination, so understood, via variably strict world quantifiers, in a modal framework including both possible and so-called impossible worlds. The latter secure lack of classical logical closure for the relevant mental states, while the variability of strictness captures how the agent imports information from actuality in the imagined non-actual scenarios. Imagination turns out to be highly hyperintensional, but not logically anarchic. Section 1 sets the stage and impossible worlds are quickly introduced in Sect. 2. Section 3 proposes to model imagination via variably strict world quantifiers. Section 4 introduces the formal semantics. Section 5 argues that imagination has a minimal mereological structure validating some logical inferences. Section 6 deals with how imagination under-determines the represented contents. Section 7 proposes additional constraints on the semantics, validating further inferences. Section 8 describes some welcome invalidities. Section 9 examines the effects of importing false beliefs into the imagined scenarios. Finally, Sect. 10 hints at possible developments of the theory in the direction of two-dimensional semantics.
Reprint years
2018
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BERIWA-4
Upload history
First archival date: 2017-02-25
Latest version: 2 (2017-02-25)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-01-31

Total views
441 ( #13,970 of 2,446,083 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
37 ( #18,692 of 2,446,083 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.