Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications
Springer (2013)
Abstract
A logic is called 'paraconsistent' if it rejects the rule called 'ex contradictione quodlibet', according to which any conclusion follows from inconsistent premises. While logicians have proposed many technically developed paraconsistent logical systems and contemporary philosophers like Graham Priest have advanced the view that some contradictions can be true, and advocated a paraconsistent logic to deal with them, until recent times these systems have been little understood by philosophers. This book presents a comprehensive overview on paraconsistent logical systems to change this situation. The book includes almost every major author currently working in the field. The papers are on the cutting edge of the literature some of which discuss current debates and others present important new ideas. The editors have avoided papers about technical details of paraconsistent logic, but instead concentrated upon works that discuss more 'big picture' ideas. Different treatments of paradoxes takes centre stage in many of the papers, but also there are several papers on how to interpret paraconistent logic and some on how it can be applied to philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language, and metaphysics.
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9401782091 9400744374 9400744390
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BERPLT
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Archival date: 2013-05-20
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New Arguments for Adaptive Logics as Unifying Frame for the Defeasible Handling of Inconsistency.Diderik Batens
Distribution in the Logic of Meaning Containment and in Quantum Mechanics.Ross T. Brady & Andrea Meinander
Making Sense of Paraconsistent Logic: The Nature of Logic, Classical Logic and Paraconsistent Logic.Koji Tanaka
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2010-11-04
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1,121 ( #3,152 of 55,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
110 ( #5,331 of 55,984 )
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