Rolling back the Rollback Argument

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (39):43-61 (2020)
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Abstract

By means of the Rollback Argument, this paper argues that metaphysically robust probabilities are incompatible with a kind of control which can ensure that free actions are not a matter of chance. Our main objection to those (typically agent-causal) theories which both attribute a kind of control to agents that eliminates the role of chance concerning free actions and ascribe probabilities to options of decisions is that metaphysically robust probabilities should be posited only if they can have a metaphysical explanatory role but probabilities can explain anything only if chance has a role. First, we reconstruct the Rollback Argument. Second, we criticize the standard ways of reconciling non-chancy control with metaphysically robust probabilities. Finally, we respond to those worries that are related to the thought experiment of the Rollback Argument.

Author Profiles

János Tőzsér
Research Centre for The Humanities, Budapest, Hungary
László Bernáth
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences

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