Reinholds Erkenntnistheorie des Dissens

In Violetta Stolz, Martin Bendeli & Marion Heinz (eds.), Wille, Willkür, Freiheit: Reinholds Freiheitskonzeption im Kontext der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunders. Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter. pp. 453-469 (2012)
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Abstract
This paper explains and defends Reinhold’s epistemology of disagreement. The concept of agreement is of central importance for Reinhold’s philosophy. He attempts to settle the most basic disputes among post-Kantian philosophers by offering intermediate positions that reconcile the seemingly incompatible views. Moreover, Reinhold argues for epistemic objectivism, that is, the thesis that a group of philosophers sharing the same information and respecting each other’s opinion may not reasonably disagree. If the members of such a group search for truth then they must converge toward consensus. Disagreement is irrational.
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Archival date: 2018-12-17
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