Representationalism, First-person Authority, and Second-order Knowledge

In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-52 (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper argues that, given the representational theory of mind, one cannot know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to being incapable of having any knowledge states; but one can know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to some other proposition q.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-12-17
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
14 ( #38,993 of 39,984 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #30,166 of 39,984 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.