Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology

Episteme 12 (2):145-153 (2015)
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Abstract
I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction on process types, or fail to rule out cases with the sort of structure that generates the worry, or both.
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2015
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First archival date: 2014-06-09
Latest version: 3 (2015-08-06)
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