Should the teleosemanticist be afraid of semantic indeterminacy?

Mind and Language (N/A) (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The teleosemantic indeterminacy problem has generated much discussion but no consensus. One possible solution is to accept indeterminacy as a real feature of some representations. I call this view “indeterminacy realism.” In this paper, I argue that indeterminacy realism should be treated as a serious option. By drawing an analogy with vagueness, I try to show that accepting the reality of indeterminacy would not be catastrophic for teleosemantics. I further argue that there are positive reasons to endorse indeterminacy realism. I end the paper by arguing that indeterminacy realism need not generalize viciously to the case of propositional attitudes.

Author's Profile

Karl G. Bergman
Uppsala University


Added to PP

56 (#72,987)

6 months
46 (#37,066)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?