Truth in Fiction, Impossible Worlds, and Belief Revision

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):178-193 (2019)
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We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
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2018, 2019
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First archival date: 2018-03-21
Latest version: 3 (2019-04-29)
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The Stories of Logics.Kapsner, Andreas

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