The Method of Thought Experiments: Probability and Counterfactuals

Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

We find a simple counterfactual acceptable, it is argued, to the extent that (i) our probability of the consequent under the thought experiment of counterfactually supposing the antecedent is high, (ii) provided the latter is on-topic with respect to the former. Counterfactual supposition is represented by Lewisian imaging. Topicality, by an algebra of subject matters. A topic-sensitive probabilistic logic is then provided, to reason about the acceptability of simple counterfactuals.

Author Profiles

Franz Berto
University of St. Andrews
Aybüke Özgün
University of Amsterdam

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